Illustrations
schedule, funding, and associated risk. Finally, the study gives some recommendations to mitigate the risk of -running out" of aircraft before the JSF is fully fielded.
The study concludes that there will not be sufficient F-16 force structure available to meet requirements. The aircraft's current structural configuration will not meet its service life goals, and attrition losses will outpace replacement. The study also concludes that the Joint Strike
Fighter will not likely be fielded as programmed. Cost cutting measures and competing modernization interests will cause the aircraft to be fielded in fewer numbers, stretched over a longer period of time.
Finally, the study makes recommendations in areas consisting of service life improvement, attrition reserve preservation, and force structure enhancements.
Chapter 1

Statement of the Problem
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the U.S. Air Forces answer to replace its aging F-16 and A/OA-10 multi-purpose fighter force, comprising approximately 87% of the entire USAF multipurpose fleet. Of that, the F-16 accounts for 68%. Will the USAF be capable of replacing 68% of our multi-purpose fighter force with the JSF as programmed?
Over the last six years or so, lawmakers have debated over continued procurement of the F-16 Falcon, the Air Force's primary multi-role fighter. Proponents of continued procurement argued that failure to keep the production lines flowing would result in a two things; a reduction in the available industrial capacity due to the lack of an active production line, and the possibility that there would not be sufficient numbers of aircraft available to meet USAF force structure requirements after the turn of the century. First, the 8,000-hour service life limits that F-16 force structure is designed around will not be realized. Some major structural components will not make the 8,000-hour projection, causing catastrophic damage where repair or replacement is not economically feasible. Additionally, engineering analyses and structural upgrades will not keep pace with changes to the way we utilize the aircraft. Secondly, the current fielding schedule for the JSF is high risk at best, most likely being fielded in fewer numbers and later than originally programmed.
Study Limitations and Assumptions
In solving this perplexing problem, there are a number of limitations that should be stated up front. First, while much of the study will focus on the JSF as a replacement for the F-16, it will also replace the aging USAF A/OA-10 fleet. When considering effects on force structure, a seemingly obvious solution may be to replace an F-16 with an A/OA-10 in units who's primary roles may be well-suited for either airframe, such as the Forward Air Control (FAC-A) and Close
Air Support (CAS) roles. This study does not address this issue. Second, force structure, budgets, and aircraft availability are dynamic, changing day-by-day. For the purpose of this study, data used is generally from the fiscal year 02 POM development period and prior. Recent events, to include the passing of the torch from former President Clinton to President Bush and his cabinet are making significant impact on the issues discussed in this study. The impending Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the development of a new National Security Strategy will also impact any recommendations brought forth in this study. Finally, all structural and flying hour data provided for this study by F-16 SPO engineers at Ogden ALC is based on Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) analysis from fiscal year 1999.
This study also draws from the assumption that the 20 FWE requirement is valid, and that certain portions of the force structure dedicated to training and test are not available for combat, or can be counted as part of the overall FWE. Additionally, having worked closely with F-16 sustainment, much of the information in this study is familiar, weighing heavily on the conclusions presented here. In many cases information presented is from memory, but backed up with sources where appropriate.
Research Question and Preview of the Argument
By fiscal year 2008, the Air Force will have a 108-fighter deficit. By fiscal year 2021 that number will grow to 311. These numbers are based on the today's programmed F-16 attrition rate of 3.6%, an estimated 8,000-hour F-16 service life, and full fielding of the Joint Strike
Fighter for training beginning in fiscal year 2009. This research study will attempt to answer the question, -Will there be sufficient combat-capable F-16 aircraft available to meet USAF force structure requirements prior to fielding of the JSF?" There are primarily two parts to this answer. The first is to gain an understanding of the current status of the F-16 fleet. The second part of the answer will examine fielding of the JSF as the replacement for the F-16, it's forecast schedule, funding, and risk associated with procurement. Lastly, I will examine what actions can be taken to mitigate the risk of -running out" of aircraft before the JSF is fully fielded. In attempting to answer the first is question, I will look at the F-16 fleet, its background, current status, and force structure. Today the F-16 is experiencing many of the same problems that a majority of the USAF fighter fleet is facing. Issues relating to aging structures and components, diminishing manufacturing sources, reduced spares availability, inexperienced operators and maintainers, reduced budgets, large infrastructure, and staggering OPTEMPO. As a result, it is easy to see how over the last decade, the F-16 consistently fails to meet it's mission capable rate goal.
1 So what is different about the F-16, and why does its health or lack thereof, have such an impact on our ability to meet future force structure requirements? Basically, this question can be answered by looking at three general areas related to the F-16.
First, the aircraft's current structural configuration will not meet its original service life goals. This failure lies primarily in the difference between the aircraft's original design criteria, and the manner in which it has actually been flown. But also, the failure of the acquisition, engineering, and sustainment communities to accurately identify, program for, and modify the aircraft to meet changing operational demands contributed to the problem. Secondly, attrition losses will severely impact USAF's ability to meet future fighter force structure requirements. Engines are top among the primary contributors to the current programmed annual attrition rate of 3.6%. 3 Other contributors such as spatial disorientation (Spatial-D), G-induced loss of consciousness (GLOC), and controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) (The latter drove congress to mandate installation of an automatic ground collision-avoidance system, termed AUTOGCAS, that is meeting with great resistance amongst the operational requirements community.) play a smaller role in the programmed attrition. Additionally,
Congressional support for continued attrition aircraft purchases, which is always divided and hotly debated, will fail to keep pace with attrition losses. Also of significance is the fact that the annual programmed attrition rate is calculated each year based on the actual number of mishaps and aircraft losses. Losses due to service life have not been of much consequence. But as the fleet's average flight time starts to approach those service life limits, our attrition forecasts will increase accordingly.
Finally, the current F-16 force structure is too large to support, given the first two factors. of the entire F-16 fleet, ranging from blocks 10 through 52. 4 This will significantly impact the ability of the USAF to meet future Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) requirements. When combined with the service life and attrition issues, they add up to difficulties maintaining required force structure in the future.
Background
The fact that the current structural configuration of the F-16 will not meet it's original service life goals is significant only if there is nothing done to remedy the fact. This will require addressing those issues that led to the current state of affairs, primarily the F-16's original design criteria, its' actual utilization, and how the engineering, acquisition, and logistics community failed to take appropriate action.
Design Criteria
The F-16 is the first fracture-based designed aircraft. 5 The fracture-based design consists of two components, durability life, and damage tolerance life. Durability life refers to -the ability of the structure to resist failure for a specified period of time due to cracking, corrosion, wear, 12 How could we have missed the mark on number of G-exceedences? Well there are a number of reasons. First, the design criteria assumed a mission mix consisting of primarily air-to-air, and was not sufficiently structured for heavy gross weights. The current maximum allowable gross weight for pre-block 40 aircraft has increased to 37,500 lbs, with up to 42,500 lbs allowed during contingency operations. This increase was approved without accomplishing a service life analysis, to determine the effects of additional weight on airframe structures. concept. A PDM is a recurring inspection requirement that must be performed by the aviation depot, where certain inspections or repairs must be done on a recurring basis, and can only be performed by depot-level technicians. As a result of the damage tolerance life design, the F-16 has no components that can not be inspected at the base level, and it has no recurring maintenance requirements driving it in to a depot for repair. 14 Second, we must go back to the ASIP program. There are two key components to the system: good collection, and good analysis. Where we failed is in the analysis area. Each year, Air Combat Command, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve pay $6.54 million to fund ASIP through the Sustaining Engineering Requirements Plan (SERP). 15 Prior to 1999, no funds were actually
provided by the MAJCOMs to analyze this data. Therefore no monitoring of fleet usage or proactive failure predictions took place. In 1999, The MAJCOMs did fund ASIP analysis, resulting in the information presented in this study.
Structural Modification Programs:
In the absence of a PDM, structural modifications are performed as required at the depot facility at Ogden ALC. The F-16 has undergone one major modification program, one major repair program, and is in the process of planning a second major modification program. Falcon-UP began in fiscal year 93 as the first major modification program accomplished at Ogden, and will continue through fiscal year 04. The purpose of the program was to upgrade those structural components identified by ASIP analysis and actual failures in the field to be of most concern. Falcon-Up ( Figure 3 ) included all blocks except blocks 10/15, and when accomplished would provide additional service life to those components, enabling them to reach Falcon-STAR will replace components identified as high fail potential, and extend the expected service life for those components to 8,000 hours.
Falcon-STAR will not be the last of the structural modification programs. While it will extend the expected service life on replaced structural components based on today's ASIP data, it cannot predict changes due to new weapons, tactics, and training. The introduction of new GPSguided and standoff munitions, new targeting pods, advance integrated weapons pylons, and new defensive system dispensers, tactics are certain to change, not to mention the aircraft stress points. These changes will drive additional structural modifications that can not yet be predicted.
So with this in mind, how many hours of service life should programmers depend on when determining future force structure planning? The question is not easily answered?
Attrition
Attrition losses will severely impact USAF's ability to meet future fighter force structure requirements. Unexpected losses due to engine failures and Congress and DoD's resistance to adequately fund attrition replacement aircraft are major contributors to the attrition shortfall.
Today in the year 2001, the block 42 version of the F-16 is below attrition reserve levels, with no programmed replacement. (See Table 3 Referring to the future prospects of sustaining future force structure, Burt Cooper, in his report to Congress over continued procurement made the following statement. His comment serves to be somewhat prophetic, as we look back over history from today.
-F-16 Supporters argue that procurement of the aircraft should continue in order to sustain the multi-role fighter force through the early 2000s, noting that normal peacetime attrition will result in inventory shortages around the turn of the century and well before any JAST-derived (JSF) aircraft is likely to be in production. ( losses, there will be a USAF force structure -bathtub" of 2.5 FWEs.
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Inefficiencies exist in the current F-16 force structure and it is too large to support, given the service life and attrition issues. This is significant for two reasons. even that structural components, such as bulkheads and landing gear be replaced. 30 Even with all of these items accomplished, most of the block 15 aircraft will have configuration and gross weight restrictions, not to mention the fact that few will have the accurate up-to-date avionics software, or even be capable of firing an AMRAAM missile. This is not the answer to filling the impending gap between the F-16s useful life and the JSF.
As we have seen the prospect for retaining sufficient combat capable F-16 aircraft to meet USAF force structure requirements prior to fielding of the JSF is grim. The aircraft's current structural configuration will not meet its original service life goals. This failure lies primarily in the difference between the aircraft's original design criteria, and the manner in which it has actually been flown. But also, the failure of the acquisition, engineering, and sustainment communities to accurately identify, program, and modify the aircraft to meet changing operational demands contributed to the problem. Additionally, attrition losses severely impact our ability to meet future fighter force structure requirements, primarily due to engine related losses and a failure to support continued attrition aircraft purchases. Finally, the current F-16 force structure is too large to support, given the first two factors. 2 Sorenson, Tim, Engineer, F-16 System Program Office, -Falcon STAR" briefing. 12 Sep 1999. The photo are of the first catastrophic failure of the Upper fuels shelf on two separate aircraft from the ANG unit at Kingsley Field, Or. The aircraft were off station as static displays at a local airshow. Both were found leaking significant amounts of fuel into a non-vented area as a result of cracked bulkheads in the wing root/fuel shelf area. These aircraft were the first to exhibit significant structural failure, kicking off a series of structural upgrades. 3 
JSF Program Office
To answer the research question completely, we must look at the Joint Strike Fighter program. Specifically, when it will be fielded, how many will we buy, and what the risk is associated with fielding? The first three questions are relatively easily answered. The answer to the fourth has significant impact on the ability of the USAF to maintain adequate multi-role fighter force structure through the year 2020.
Simply stated, the JSF will not be fielded as planned. This is so for a couple of reasons.
First, there is an extremely high possibility that defense procurement budgets will not meet the services' full modernization requirements. When procurement dollars fall short, trade-offs will be made in terms of numbers, length, and even survival of major force programs, all three of which the JSF is vulnerable to. Secondly, the JSF may not have all the political support in the best. The JSF, dubbed by some as a -Democratic" airplane 9 , is in jeopardy of being the first victim of a -re-thinking" about ongoing major force modernization programs. This is spurred on by the recent debates over procurement funding shortfalls, a change of administration, and a new National Security Strategy.
Prior to the elections, a top Bush advisor was quoted as saying -if elected Mr. Bush is to review the pentagons three tactical aviation programs, and may conclude that less than 3,000 aircraft are necessary," saying that -skipping a generation" of weapon systems may be the best course of action, considering today's threat. 10 Now President Bush has been heard saying that he considers the proposed production of 3,000 Joint Strike Fighters to be -a bit much."
11
In his January article in Defense Week, Christian Lowe quoted a noted aerospace expert as saying -The JSF program is in serious trouble, and it's future is in doubt. With President Bush's pledge to review all the tactical aviation programs, and calling for -skipping a generation" of weapons systems, many feel the JSF will come under the skeptical eye. If this information isn't enough to convince anyone that the JSF will most likely not be fielded on time, consider the following. In 1997 the GAO released a report on the affordability of DOD's investment strategy for aircraft procurement. The report noted that the Pentagon's strategy to fund modernization from the "large savings generated from initiatives to downsize defense infrastructure and acquisition reform" was unrealistic in that Congressional projections at that time suggested that in the forseeable future, overall defense spending would remain stable at best. The report suggested that the DoD has -historically made long-term commitments to acquire weapon systems based on optimistic procurement profiles and then significantly altered those profiles because of funding." The report also suggests that to deal with funding shortfalls, the DoD may need to -reduce planned aircraft procurement." 
Conclusions
After serious consideration of the facts presented in this study, it is clear to see that if the 20 FWE requirement is valid, there will not be sufficient F-16 aircraft available to meet future fighter force structure requirements. There are four primary reasons that I make this conclusion.
First, the aircraft's current and planned structural configuration will not meet its required service life. Second, attrition replacement will not keep pace with losses, severely impacting the USAF's ability to meet future fighter force structure requirements. Third, current F-16 force structure is too large to adequately support through the first two decades of this century. And finally, the Joint Strike Fighter will not be fielded as originally programmed.
Service Life: The F-16 in it's current configuration, will not meet its service life expectations. This is primarily attributed to the difference between the aircraft's original design criteria, and the manner in which it has actually been flown. Originally programmed to reach an 8,000-hour service life at the design criteria, the F-16 has experienced actual loads up to 10 times more severe than expected. But also, the failure of the acquisition, engineering, and sustainment communities to accurately identify, program, and modify the aircraft to meet changing operational demands contributed to the problem. Timeliness of analysis of ASIP program data left long period gaps between modification programs. Once ASIP analysis was accomplished, the scope and size of the recommended modifications were reduced to save money. Failure to adequately fund these structural modifications also contribute to the service life problem. ACC, ANG, and AFRC failed to fund engineering studies outside of the ASIP program to look into structural components consistently failing in the field. Additionally when new capabilities are programmed for the aircraft, no service life analysis is done to determine the overall effect on the aircraft service life. Many thought Seek EAGLE flight certification testing was sufficient analysis, unfortunately Seek EAGLE testing just provides certification of airworthiness.
Although planners have fully funded Falcon STAR for all aircraft block 25-52, this will only guarantee an 8,000-service life on those components it replaces. Other major structures will fail prior to the 8,000-hour mark.
Attrition: Attrition losses will severely impact USAF's ability to meet future fighter force structure requirements, primarily due to engine failures and the USAF inability to replace attrition reserve aircraft. As a leading cause of attrition, known safety-related modifications are not funded nor implemented in a timely manner. This is due in part to the fact that there is no advocacy for funding such modifications. The engine PEM only has obligation authority for maintenance and upkeep of engines, whereas the weapon system PEMs must be the advocate for modifications affecting their weapon system. Additionally, the historical debate in Congress over continued procurement of the F-16, and the DoD's unwillingness to provide the resources necessary to purchase sufficient replacement aircraft have reduced attrition reserves significantly. By the end of next year, three of the seven block models of aircraft, excluding blocks 10 and 15, will no longer have attrition reserve aircraft available. The Program Decision Memorandum to store 200 -good condition" block 15 aircraft in inviolate storage as reserve for force structure shortfalls fills force structure -holes" with incapable aircraft at significant cost.
Force Structure: The current F-16 force structure is too large to support. Failure to replace attrition losses as mentioned earlier has led to the current situation in which we are now. Low availability of attrition reserve aircraft make moving aircraft difficult at best. With the possibility of three of the seven block models of aircraft going below attrition reserve levels by the end of next year, the ability of planners to re-shuffle aircraft within the total force is becoming more and more difficult. With over 45% of the entire F-16 force structure residing within the Air Reserve Component, planners must balance force needs with the ARC political influences. Moreover, Air Staff and ACC programmers are basing force structure requirements based on an expected 8,000-hour aircraft service life, which is high risk at best. 
Recommendations Service Life
Certainly the area for greatest improvement is in the area of extending the aircraft's service life to guarantee the aircraft will make it to the 8,000-hour mark that all our future force programming is based on. To do so will require a combination of operations and logistics working together to reduce impact on the fleet. produced by the Air Force, and is available through normal media publication channels.
Recommendation 5: Implement limitations for certain configurations and sortie types.
While I will admit this is a last resort, it may at some point in time be absolutely necessary. To impose limits on G's, certain missions, configurations, and gross weights would ensure sufficient F-16 aircraft are available for use in a major conflict. This option should only be implemented at such a time there is risk of having insufficient combat aircraft to effectively prosecute a war, at which time the limits must be lifted.
Recommendation 6: Install an integrated overload warning system. The USAF should consider the installation of an on-board overload warning system similar to the one currently installed on the F-15. The purpose of such a system would be to warn pilots of situations in which they were approaching overload situations on the aircraft structures.
Attrition
There are two major recommendations for mitigating the attrition factor. First, to place emphasis on reducing engine-related attrition by investing in engine modernization. Second, we must simply purchase more aircraft to replace our attrition losses. 
Force Structure
Finally, by restructuring the F-16 force, we can help to alleviate current and potential problems with certain block models, while still meeting USAF readiness requirements. I must say however that movement of force structure is the most difficult thing to do in many cases.
The politics involved in moving aircraft, missions, and possibly jobs between state lines normally tends to bring the politicians heavily into the fray. The political influence brought by the ARC makes this issue even more difficult. The following recommendation serves the purpose of freeing-up F-16 force structure by finding new roles, missions, and aircraft for some units. modified with avionics similar to the block 42. The 56FW at Luke, AFB also operates the block 42, to provide training to USAF and FMS customers requiring the advanced avionics. As you may recall, the block 42 is in the worst shape as far as available attrition reserve aircraft (negative four). A solution is to accomplish MLU on sufficient block 15 aircraft to achieve the required FMS training at Tucson, and transfer the block 42 aircraft to the 56 FW at Luke AFB.
Summary
As we have seen the prospect for retaining sufficient combat capable F-16 aircraft to meet USAF force structure requirements prior to fielding of the JSF is marginal at best for a number of reasons. First, we found that the aircraft's current structural configuration will not meet its original service life goals. This failure lies primarily in the difference between the aircraft's original design criteria, and the manner in which it has actually been flown. Second, we discovered that attrition losses will severely impact our ability to meet future fighter force structure requirements, primarily due to engine related losses and a failure to support continued attrition aircraft purchases. Third, current F-16 force structure is too large to support, given the first two factors, and finally the JSF will not be fielded as planned for a couple of reasons. There is an extremely high possibility that defense procurement budgets will not meet the services' full modernization requirements. When procurement dollars fall short, trade-offs will be made in terms of numbers, length, and even survival of major force programs, all three of which the JSF is vulnerable to. Secondly, the JSF may not have all the political support in the Legislative and
Executive branches it will require to survive. Certainly the recent change in administration has cast a new shadow of doubt on the immediate need for the JSF, further exacerbating the F-16
issue. Finally, I made recommendations for extending F-16 force structure in three major areas; service life, attrition, and force structure. While not the complete answer, it is evident that action must be taken right now to preserve our combat capability through the first two decades of the twenty-first century.
Notes
